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Abs tract
We ana lyze the e¾ ects of s imple s tylized economic policy rules , or s tabi-
liza tion principles , when À uctuations in economic activity are created endoge-
nously by self-ful¿ lling vola tile expecta tions . We study a s imple moneta ry
competitive model with intertemporally optimizing agents and a government.
We only depart from neoclass ica l orthodoxy by assuming tha t a cycle or a
sunspot equilibrium, not necessa rily a s teady s ta te , could be the descrip-
tive dynamic ra tiona l expecta tions equilibrium. The government may then
well out of welfa re concerns want to conduct sys tematic s tabiliza tion policy
through trans fe rs , expenditure , and taxa tion even though this has dis tor-
tionary e¾ ects . We show tha t the policy rules that s tabilize output in a
way that is bes t for welfare involve countercyclica l e lements in government
activity.
JEL Classi¿ ca tion: E32 and E63.
Keywords : Endogenous bus iness cycles , s tabiliza tion policy.
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1 Introduction
What are the implica tions for s tabiliza tion policies if economic À uctuations , or
bus iness cycles , are to an important extent crea ted endogenous ly by the economies '
equilibrium mechanisms , and are not sole ly reactions to exogenous shocks? We ¿ nd
tha t, even under perfectly competitive conditions , the occurrence of endogenous
À uctuations due to se lf-ful¿ lling vola tile expecta tions may give reasons based upon
welfare concerns for systematic government s tabiliza tion policy, and the policy rules
which bes t s tabilize economic activity with respect to welfare involve a certa in kind
of countercyclica lity in government activity.
We study the most s tandard and fully competitive dynamic model of expecta tions-
driven endogenous À uctua tions . This happens to be the s imple overlapping gen-
e ra tions model with only labor as input in production, but by the argument of
Woodford (1986), the mode l has an equivalent inte rpre ta tion with in¿ nite ly lived
agents and cash-in-advance cons tra ints . The model involves a government which
we assume can tax income proportionally and pay transfers to the old. However,
(pos itive) rea l transfe rs to the old and government demand for output work in ex-
actly the same way in the cons ide red mode l as long as government and priva te
demand for goods are assumed to be perfect subs titutes in the consumers ' utility
functions (which is a natura l bench mark assumption). Real government spending
can therefore be inte rpre ted equally as real transfe rs or government demand.
We depart from neoclass ica l orthodoxy by assuming tha t a cycle or a sunspot
equilibrium could be the re levant ra tional expecta tions equilibrium describing how
the economy evolves over time.1 As far as s teady s ta te is concerned the mode l is
such tha t neoclass ica l policy views are strongly supported; active government is
unambiguous ly bad. The essentia l departure from Keynesian modelling is tha t we
do not assume any price rigidities .
Government spending is linked to the performance of the economy by policy
1 The suÁ cient condition norma lly cons idered for the exis tence of endogenous À uctua tions under
la is sez fa ire in the s imple OLG model is tha t the e las ticity of labor supply with respect to the
inte rtempora l rea l wage measured a t s teady sta te is les s than minus one ha lf. Some ¿ nd this
problematic. Howeve r, the purpose here is not to obta in plaus ible conditions for the exis tence of
expecta tions-driven endogenous À uctua tions , but ra ther to demons tra te how certa in inte rtempora l
e¾ ects of s tabiliza tion policie s become of (increased) importance , should such À uctua tions occur.
We may therefore as well s ta rt from the s imples t poss ible model of expecta tions-driven endogenous
À uctua tions .
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rules meant to formalize rea lis tic or frequently sugges ted s tabiliza tion principles .
It is ¿ nanced e ither by proportiona l income taxation or by inÀ ationary taxation
(se igniorage). We consider and axiomatize a simple class of policy rules where in
each period rea l government spending depends homogeneous ly on the current and
the past leve l of GNP. Two specia l cases are : s´pending proportional to current
GNP,´ and s´pending proportional to pas t GNP.´ These are important because
they are s imple , manageable and poss ibly implementable by automatic s tabilizers .
The ¿ rs t of these two cases is equivalent to a rranging spending such that, in the
absence of income taxation, a constant money growth ra te results .
Our conclus ions are tha t even under fully competitive conditions , the assump-
tion that expecta tions driven endogenous À uctuations could be re levant ra tiona l
expecta tions dynamic equilibria may well, on welfare grounds , motivate sys tematic
s tabiliza tion policies by the government. Moreover, despite the absence of price
rigiditie s to motivate it, the policy rules which s tabilize economic activity in the
best way with respect to welfare enta il a certa in kind of countercyclica lity in gov-
e rnment activity: government spending should be re la tive ly low in periods up to
which output has increased by a re la tive ly large amount.
The intuition for why counte rcyclica l policy rules s tabilize output most e¾ ec-
tive ly, and a t the lowest welfa re cos ts , is s imple and re la ted to certa in intertempora l
e¾ ects of sys tematic s tabiliza tion policies . Assume that GNP increases by a re la -
tive ly large amount from one period to the next. If this is correctly foreseen from
the ¿ rs t period, and people know and believe in a countercyclica l policy rule , then
they will expect re la tive ly low transfe rs during the next period. If le isure and output
a re normal goods (which is rea lis tic), labor supply and output will increase in the
¿ rs t pe riod, and thus the increase in output from the ¿ rs t to the second period will
be reduced. If (re la tive ly large) changes in output are reduced, output will become
more s table . Inte res tingly, Benassy (1998) ¿ nds tha t a s imilar intertemporal e¾ ect
is important for the s tabiliza tion of competitive À uctua tions caused by exogenous
shocks , and Benassy a lso es tablishes support for countercyclica l policy rules .
The present paper is re la ted to contributions such as Grandmont (1986), Goenka
(1994), S ims (1994), and Woodford (1994), which a lso s tudy the e¾ ects of ¿ xed and
realis tic policy rules on endogenous À uctuations , and closes t to the ¿ rs t of these .
There a re , however, three main di¾ erences in assumptions between Grandmont's
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and our paper, which imply that we are led to radica lly di¾ erent policy conclus ions .
Firs t, Grandmont makes (implicit) assumptions on fundamenta ls ensuring that the
perfect fores ight dynamic he derives has a traditional u´ni-moda l´ shape , whereas
we cons ider a se t of assumptions a lso allowing other shapes . Second, Grandmont
s tudies constant money growth rules , whereas we cons ide r a broader class of policy
rules conta ining cons tant money growth rules as specia l cases . Third, Grandmont
assumes zero subs titution be tween priva te and public goods (government demand
does not ente r into utility functions at a ll), whereas we assume perfect subs titution.
The bas ic ¿ nding of Grandmont is tha t cons tant money growth rules will s tabilize
the economy at s teady sta te if the money growth ra te is large enough. Our results
indica te tha t cons tant money growth rules a re , a t bes t, ve ry poor s tabiliza tion
instruments . There is no formal contradiction between Grandmont's analys is and
ours , but the broader assumptions we cons ider lead us to results from which the
policy implica tions that could be drawn are very di¾ erent from those that could be
drawn from Grandmont's analys is .
Our cons idera tion of more di¾ erent assumptions on fundamenta ls revea ls tha t
cons tant money growth rules , a lthough e¾ ective in s tabilizing output under some
assumptions on fundamenta ls , a re incapable of s tabilizing output under othe r and
equa lly plaus ible assumptions .
Our analys is of a parametrized class of policy rules reveals which aspects of
policy rules make them e¾ ective with respect to s tabiliza tion. It turns out that
countercyclica lity in the sense expla ined above is essentia l. Cons tant money growth
rules a re equiva lent to s´pending proportiona l to current GNP-´rules , and hence
they are procyclica l. In fact we ¿ nd that cons tant money growth rules a re just a t
the boundary of the se t of policy rules that can be s tabilizing a t a ll, and even when
they are in this se t, they s tabilize output in a wors t possible way welfarewise .
Our assumption on the degree of substitution be tween private and government
demand gives us, contra ry to Grandmont, tha t cons tant money growth rules , not
only for transfe rs , but a lso for government demand, are ine¾ ective s tabiliza tion
instruments . This reveals tha t the assumed degree of subs titution be tween priva te
and government demand is important for the intertemporal e¾ ects of sys tematic
s tabiliza tion policies working through government demand.
An important fea ture shared by Grandmont's and our model is tha t it is s imple
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enough to give a one-dimens ional, ¿ rs t order di¾ erence equation as perfect fores ight
dynamic. This makes it poss ible to es tablish enough globa l propertie s to be able
to use global determinacy as criterion for s tabiliza tion. Other authors s tudy more
complica ted models yie lding two-dimensiona l dynamic systems , e .g. Schmitt-Grohi
and Uribe (1997), and Guo and Lans ing (1997), (1998). It is then diÁ cult to
establish enough globa l properties of the dynamic sys tem to be able to use global
determinacy as a stabiliza tion criterion. These papers then use local determinacy: if
government policy can turn the s teady s ta te away from being a s ink it is considered
to s tabilize the economy. However, it is only in linear sys tems that loca l dete rminacy
is suÁ cient for the elimination of endogenous À uctua tions , and linearity only follows
from specia l assumptions on fundamenta ls . Us ing loca l determinacy as s tabiliza tion
criterion is essentia lly the same as studying only a linear approximation of the
dynamic sys tem around the s teady sta te and is particularly questionable for the
two-dimens ional case s ince with non-linearity a local property of the s teady s ta te
di¾ erent from it being a s ink can suÁ ce for the exis tence of endogenous À uctua tions ,
see Grandmont, P intus , and de Vilder (1998). Chris tiano and Harrison (1996) also
s tress the importance of one-dimensiona l dynamics , and for the same reasons as we
do, but, like Guo and Lansing (1998), they s tudy the e¾ ects of more sophis tica ted
policies involving, e .g., progress ive taxation.
In Section 2 we describe the bas ics of the economic model and the class of policy
rules we cons ider. Section 3 derives the equilibrium dynamics , and Section 4 sta tes
the results on the s tabilizing and des tabilizing e¾ ects of di¾ erent policy rules . In
Section 5 we provide two illus tra tive examples concerning the particularly inter-
es ting rules g´overnment spending proportional to current GNP´and g´overnment
spending proportional to pas t GNP.´ Section 6 summarizes conclus ions. Proofs of
propositions a re given in Appendix A. Appendix B conta ins a technica l result tha t
is of importance for our purposes , and may be of independent interest.
2 The Economy and the Policy Rules
We cons ider an overlapping genera tions model in discre te time. In each period the
commodities are labor input, produced output, and money. The money prices of
labor and output a re j k ( and  k ( respective ly, and labor and output marke ts
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are perfectly competitive . Subscript 0 is used for explicit re ference to a period.
In each period a representa tive ¿ rm produces output r  ( from labor input
q  ( under cons tant re turns to sca le , r ) q.
There is in each period one young and one old consumer, and a consumer is
endowed with one unit of labor time in his youth. The von Neumann-Morgens tern
utility function of a consumer is ‘wD L 8wD, where   ( is output consumption in
the consumer's old age , and  U) d z  ( is le isure consumption in the youth; z
is labor supply when young.
The assumption tha t in the ¿ rs t period of a consumer's life only le isure ente rs
utility, and in the second only consumption, implies an equiva lence to a cash-in-
advance cons tra ined economy with an in¿ nite ly-lived consumer. In the la tter type
of mode l the consumer maximizes  7)0w8w7D L 4‘w7DDbwd L D70 in each period 0
subject to a budget cons tra int. If, in addition, the re are binding cash-in-advance-
cons tra ints , he or she can do no better than to maximize 8w0D L 4‘w0LdDbwd L D
independently over each success ion of two periods under the cons tra int tha t wha t
can be used for consumption in 0Ld is what was earned from work in 0, see Woodford
(1986). For this a lternative mode l interpre ta tion our ‘wD is 4‘wDbwd L D.
We impose standard assumptions on ‘ and 8: they are continuous ly di¾ eren-
tiable severa l times , ‘IwD and 8IwD are s trictly positive and go to in¿ nity as  and
 respective ly go to zero, and ‘IIwD and 8IIwD are s trictly negative . We denote the
Arrow-Pratt measure of re la tive risk avers ion in ‘ by pwD U) ‘IIwDb‘IwD k (,
and a lso de¿ ne ]wzD U) 8IIwd  zDzb8Iwd  zD k (. We assume tha t pw(D U)
j$8(pwD, and ]w(D both exis t (a re c ), and tha t pw(D W) d.
Finally, there is a government tha t in each period decides on a real lump sum
transfer K given to the period's old consumer, and on a proportional tax ra te + ,
where (  + c d, by which the income of the period's young consumer is taxed.
Both K and + are taken as parametric by the consumers . For the interpre ta tion
of our mode l with an in¿ nite ly-lived agent, the cash-in-advance cons tra int should
be assumed to work such tha t in the current period the consumer can spend las t
pe riod's ne t of tax income plus the transfer rece ived in the current period.
The variable K can, if pos itive , a lte rna tive ly be interpre ted as government de-
mand for output (or labor). If it is assumed that public and priva te goods are
perfect substitutes , so the utility function of a consumer is 8wdzDL‘wL KD, then
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the resulting dynamic model will be identica l to the one in which K is a transfer.
This will be demons tra ted below.
Policy is conducted according to certa in feedback rules linking in a sys tematic
way the value of the rea l transfe r, or government demand, to present and pas t
values of the GNP (in equilibrium r summarizes everything of economic importance
in a period). The rules are meant to formalize poss ible s tabiliza tion principles .
Government spending is ¿ nanced by either proportional taxa tion or se igniorage or
a mix of both. The exact ¿ nancing does not matte r s ince direct proportional and
inÀ ationary taxa tion have the same e¾ ects .
The considered policy rules are meant to formalize rea lis tic (or frequently sug-
ges ted), s imple , and manageable stabiliza tion principles . Therefore we con¿ ne at-
tention to rules of the form, K0Ld ) Kwr0Ld, r0D, and impose the further res trictions :
(i) The variable K should be (weakly) pos itive in all periods . For the interpre ta-
tion of K as government demand this is required. For the interpre ta tion as a transfer
the re is in principle nothing wrong with negative va lues , but K c ( means lump sum
taxation (of the old) togethe r with subs idies (to the young) proportional to income,
these subs idies coming either directly or through nega tive inÀ ation. Lump sum
taxes a re se ldom observed and varia tions in lump sum taxes are never seen as part
of s tabiliza tion policies .
(ii) At a cons tant GNP, the government behaves as if it taxes GNP by a certa in
ra te and ba lances the budget in each period. That is , we require Kwr, rD ) #r for
some # with (  # c d. Indeed, to be a formaliza tion of a s tabiliza tion principle
the rule should dicta te n´eutra l government behavior´a t a s teady GNP. We think
it is mos t rea lis tic to le t neutra l behavior correspond to ¿ xed proportiona l taxa tion
and budget balance (ra the r than, e .g. to a ¿ xed spending that is independent of r).
(iii) At a varying GNP the s tabiliza tion e¾ ort should depend on the re la tive
varia tion in GNP. If two pa irs w?, rD and w?I, rID of current and past GNPs represent
the same degree of re la tive up or down swing in economic activity, ?br ) ?IbrI,
then the government s tabiliza tion e¾ ort should be re la tive ly the same in the two
s itua tions , i.e . Kw?, rDb? ) Kw?I, rIDb?I.
These requirements are ful¿ lled if and only if K is of the form Kwr0Ld, r0D )
#*wr0Ld, r0D, where (  # c d, and * is pos itive and homogeneous of degree one ,
with *wd, dD ) d. We cons ide r such functions because they are axiomatized by
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the above requirements , tha t we ¿ nd reasonable , but an independent reason is
tha t they suÁ ce for revea ling the inte rtempora l incentive e¾ ects of importance for
s tabiliza tion of endogenous À uctua tions . It will give s imple s ta tements and proofs
of our propos itions to focus on the case ,
Kwr0Ld, r0D ) #r
d
0Ld r

0 , (1)
where there are no a priori res trictions on the parameter .
Each policy rule of the form (1) conta ins a level (or res ting) component given
by #, and a cyclica l (or reactive ) component given by . This is illus tra ted by
the rewriting Kwr0Ld, r0Dbr0Ld ) #wr0Ldbr0D. The level component # is the trans-
fe rs ' sha re in current output when output is cons tant, and the cyclica l component
wr0Ldbr0D
 is the respons iveness of this share to changes in output,  be ing the
e las ticity of the transfers ' sha re with respect to the output growth factor. The
la rge r  is , the more negative will be the reaction in the transfers ' sha re to in-
creases in output, tha t is , the more c´ounte rcyclica l´ will the rule be . In particula r,
if output evolves according to a two-period cycle with output levels _ and q, where
_ k q, and the transfer payed in periods with output _ is denoted by K_ e tc., then
wK_  KqDw_  qD ) >wd  w_bqD
1dD, where > k (, so wK_  KqDw_  qD is pos itive if
 c db1, and nega tive if  k db1. This means that a long two-period cycles policy
rules of the cons ide red form give procyclica l transfe rs (in the usual sense) when
 c db1, and counte rcyclica l when  k db1.
One reason to be inte res ted in the class (1) of policy rules is tha t it conta ins
some important and frequently cons idered rules as specia l cases:
Transfe rs proportional to current GNP. The case  ) (, gives Kwr0Ld, r0D ) #r0Ld.
Although simple , this is a feedback rule . As the economy's activity leve l va ries so
will the rea l value of the transfer in per capita te rms (procyclica lly). The rule
is equiva lent to se tting the income tax ra te cons tantly to # and le t transfe rs be
determined by budget ba lance in each period, and, in particula r, it is equivalent to
a rranging the sequence of transfers such tha t with no income taxation a cons tant
money growth ra te results (as shown below). Constant money growth rules a re often
advoca ted and were s tudied by Grandmont (1986) in connection with s tabiliza tion
of endogenous À uctua tions . Grandmont (1986) found tha t a la rge enough # will
s tabilize the economy at s teady s ta te .
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Transfe rs proportiona l to pas t GNP. The case  ) d, gives Kwr0Ld, r0D ) #r0.
Note that if taxes come with a de lay then this rule may be equiva lent to se tting
the income tax ra te constantly a t # and le tting budget balance determine K, an
implementa tion mos t re levant for the model interpre ta tion with a cash-in-advance
cons tra int and an in¿ nite ly-lived consumer. For the lite ra l overlapping genera -
tions interpre ta tion, note that this rule rewards old consumers according to how
much they worked and contributed when young. Fina lly, this rule is closer to
s tandard Keynes ian s tabiliza tion recommenda tions s ince government spending may
react countercyclica lly.
When  goes below zero or above one, the dependence of transfe rs on GNP
becomes more complica ted. As long as (    d, the rules have the poss ible
s imple implementa tion that an average (though geometrica l) of the las t two GNPs
is taxed and the revenue used for transfers .
In wha t follows it is assumed tha t the policy rule Kwr0Ld, r0D used by the govern-
ment is known by the households who a lso have ra tional expecta tions with respect
to next period's output price . Furthe rmore , the households a re assumed to believe
in the re levant policy rule .
3 Dynamic Equilibrium
In (non-trivia l) equilibrium one must have j )  in a ll pe riods , and that any leve l
of production and employment is optimal for the ¿ rm.
Cons ide r a young consumer whose expecta tion concerning the next period is
tha t with probability Ri the output price will be i and the transfer rece ived will
be Ki , where i ) d, 333, . A point expecta tion corresponds to  ) d. The consumer
chooses labor supply z, money holding E, and consumption i in each of the 
future s´ ta tes ,´ to maximize expected utility 8wd zD Li Ri‘wiD, sub ject to the
budget cons tra ints E ) wd  +Djz, and i ) Ebi L Ki for i ) d, 333, , where j
and + are the nominal wage ra te and the tax ra te in the consumer's young age
respective ly. The optimal choices for z and i are unique ly given by the ¿ rs t order
condition,
8Iwd zD
wd +Dj
)
3
i)d
Ri
‘IwiD
i
, (2)
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and the budge t constra ints ,
i ) wd +D
j
i
zL Ki for i ) d, 333, 3 (3)
In the case of a point expecta tion (where  and K are expected), the optimality
conditions amount to 8Iwd zD ) ‘IwD, and  ) zL K, where  U) wd +Djb.
Solving for z and  gives the labor supply curve z ) zw, KD, and the future demand
for produced goods  ) w, KD. It is a consequence of our assumptions tha t le isure
and consumption are both s trict normal goods, zIK c ( and IK k (.2
3.1 Temporary Equilibrium
From (3), wd  +Djbi ) wi  KiDbz. Inse rting this into (2) gives , z8Iwd  zD )

i Riwi  KiD‘
IwiD3 Inserting the equilibrium conditions z ) r and ri ) i , then
gives r8Iwd rD ) i Riwri  KiD‘IwriD. Inserting ¿ nally the policy rule Ki ) Kwri, rD
yie lds ,
r8Iwd rD )
3
i)d
Ri >ri  Kwri, rDH‘
IwriD3 (4)
This is the temporary equilibrium equation for the cons ide red economy in terms of
production levels . If the young consumer expects output in the next period to be
ri (between zero and one) with probability Ri , i ) d, 333, , and knows and believes
in the policy rule KwN, ND, then a r (between zero and one) is an equilibrium output
of the current period if and only if it ful¿ ls (4).
All ra tional expecta tions dynamic equilibria s tudied below are de¿ ned from the
tempora ry equilibrium equation (4). The tax ra tes do not ente r into this . Hence , for
a given policy rule for spending, the ra tional expecta tions equilibrium dynamics of
the considered economy is independent of how much income taxation vs . se ignior-
age is used in ¿ nancing government spending. Proportional income taxation and
inÀ ationary taxa tion work and dis tort in exactly the same way.
2 Labor supply is given by 8Iwd zD ) `IwzL KD. A la rge r K implies a lower right hand side ,
and to recrea te equality z must fa ll s ince this both decreases the left hand, and increases the right
hand, s ide , so zI
K
c (. A s imila r exercise on 8Iwd  w  KDbD ) `IwD shows I
K
k (. For la te r
use , we derive the e las ticity of labor supply wrt.  by log-di¾ erentia tion,
 U)
zI
j

z
)
d pwzL KD z
zLK
]wzD L pwzL KD z
zLK
k d3
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Conside r the alternative inte rpre ta tion of K as government demand. In this
case , the consumer would maximize 8wdzDLi Ri‘wiL KiD subject to the budget
cons tra ints i ) wd +D jiz, i ) d, 333, . The ¿ rs t order condition would be,
8Iwd zD
wd +Dj
)
3
i)d
Ri
‘Iwi L KiD
i
3
By use of the budget cons tra ints , wd  +Djbi ) ibz, one gets z8Iwd  zD )

i Rii‘
Iwi L KiD3 In equilibrium, z ) r and ri ) i L Ki, and hence r8Iwd  rD )

i Riwri  KiD‘
IwriD. Inserting a policy rule for government demand, Ki ) Kwri, rD,
would give exactly (4). The two inte rpre ta tions of K lead to the same equilibrium
condition which veri¿ es the equiva lence pos tula ted in Section 2.
3.2 Perfect Fores ight Dynamics and Steady Sta te
The economy's perfect fores ight dynamics is obta ined from (4) assuming that the
next period's output is correctly foreseen from the current pe riod in a determinis tic
sense . Inserting ri ) r0Ld for a ll i, and rewriting current output as r ) r0, one
arrives a t a ¿ rs t order, one-dimens iona l di¾ erence equa tion in r0 and r0Ld,
r08
Iwd r0D ) >r0Ld  Kwr0Ld, r0DH‘
Iwr0LdDD3 (5)
A dynamic perfect fores ight equilibrium is a sequence wr0D of production leve ls
(  r0 c d, such that (5) is ful¿ lled for a ll 0. A s teady s ta te is a particular case
where r0 ) r in a ll pe riods . For a ll the policy rules we consider, Kwr, rD ) #r, and it
follows from (5) that a s trictly pos itive , or moneta ry, s teady sta te production leve l
r is given by,
8Iwd rD
‘IwrD
) d #3 (6)
S ince the MRS on the left hand s ide goes from zero to in¿ nity as r goes from zero
to one, the re is for any # a unique mone ta ry s teady s ta te rw#D, and rw#D c d. It
follows directly that rw#D is s trictly decreas ing in #, and tha t rw#D goes to zero as
# goes to one.
If we de¿ ne welfa re a t the s teady s ta te as the common utility of a ll genera tions ,
P w#D U) ‘wrw#DD L 8wd  rw#DD, then P I ) w‘I  8IDrI#, and from rI# c ( and (6),
P I c ( for a ll # k (, and P I ) ( for # ) (. This proves ,
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Propos ition A. For a ll #, there is a unique moneta ry steady s ta te involving
production rw#D, with ( c rw#D c d, and rw#D is s trictly decreas ing in # and
rw#D ( as #  d. Welfare a t s teady s ta te P w#D is unambiguously decreasing in
#, and optimal policy for s teady s ta te is # ) (.
P ropos ition A is a s imple vers ion of a familia r neoclass ica l propos ition. In the
absence of dis tributional reasons for transfers , one is left, a t s teady s ta te , with the
pure dis tortional e¾ ect of the taxa tion, direct or inÀ ationary, implied by giving the
transfers . Propos ition A implies tha t government activity has to be motivated by
the s teady s ta te not being the appropria te descriptive equilibrium. Furthermore ,
should endogenous À uctuations preva il (under la issez fa ire) and should one, by use
of a policy rule be longing to the cons ide red class , manage to s tabilize the economy
at s teady s ta te , then it is unambiguous ly to be prefe rred that this is done for as low
a va lue of # as poss ible , s ince # measures the degree of dis tortion at s teady s ta te .3
The left hand side of (5) increases from zero to in¿ nity as r0 goes from zero
to one. If   (, or # ) (, then K is (weakly) increas ing in r0, so the right hand
s ide will, for any given r0Ld k (, decrease weakly from a s trictly pos itive value as
r0 increases from zero. This means tha t for every pos itive r0Ld, the re is a unique
r0 between zero and one that solves (5), which thus everywhere implicitly de¿ nes
r0 as a function W of r0Ld. From the Implicit Function Theorem, W is continuous ly
di¾ erentiable . So, for   (, or # ) (, the backward perfect fores ight dynamic
r0 ) Wwr0LdD is well-de¿ ned globally. For  c ( and # k ( it is not. In that case
the re are for r0Ld small enough severa l solutions in r0 to (5), and for r0Ld la rge
enough there are none . As jus t shown there is , however, a unique monetary s teady
s ta te rw#D, and loca lly around rw#D the backward perfect fores ight dynamic W is
again well-de¿ ned and continuously di¾ erentiable .4
3 It could be argued tha t the right welfare measure a t s teady sta te is ra the r ~ w#D ) `wrw#DDbwdL
D L 8wd rw#DD, where  k ( is a time pre ference ra te . In a free optimiza tion one will then ¿ nd
tha t optimal policy for s teady sta te is some # c (, which, in the absence of direct taxa tion, is
equiva lent to a cons tant negative money growth ra te , a so-ca lled Friedman rule . If one only a llows
#  (, then a lso in this case # ) ( is optimal for s teady s ta te .
4 From the Implicit Function Theorem, W is loca lly well-de¿ ned by (5) around steady sta te if
the deriva tive of r08Iwd  r0D  >r0Ld  Kwr0Ld, r0DH`Iwr0LdDD wrt. r0 measured a t s teady s ta te is
not zero. This deriva tive is 8Iwd rw#DDwdL]wrw#DD L#`Iwrw#DD, which, for any given #, is zero
only for one particular (non-generic) negative va lue of .
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3.3 Rational Expecta tions Fluctuations
A determinis tic -cycle is a collection of  di¾ erent production levels ( c rd, 333, r c
d in the range where W is well-de¿ ned such that rd ) Wwr1D, 333, r ) WwrdD. An -
s ta te s ta tionary (Markov) sunspot equilibrium, SSE, cons is ts of  production leve ls
( c rd  NNN  r c d, where rd c r, and 1 trans ition probabilities R7i ,

i)d R7i ) d
for 7 ) d, 333, , where the matrix wR7iD is irreducible , such tha t, whenever the young
consumer expects tha t the output leve l ri will occur with probability R7i next period,
i ) d, 333, , then the current temporary equilibrium output level according to (4) is
exactly r7, tha t is ,
r78
Iwd r7D )
3
i)d
R7i >ri  Kwri, r7DH‘
IwriD for 7 ) d, 333, 3 (7)
The well-known idea is that one can imagine tha t an irreducible Markov cha in (a
sunspot) on s ta tes d, 333, , sending s ta te 7 into s ta te i with trans ition probability
R7i , though exogenous to the economic sys tem, may govern its performance. If
the agents know the trans ition probabilities and believe tha t in any period output
must be r7 if the s ta te is 7, then output will indeed be governed by the sunspot
and À uctuate accordingly, and the agents will have no reason to revise the ir be liefs
s ince the ir expecta tions a re probabilis tica lly correct, i.e . ra tional. An -cycle is a
particula r, non-s tochas tic -s ta te SSE.
Dete rminis tic cycles and SSE are our candidates for ra tional expecta tions dy-
namic equilibria exhibiting endogenous À uctuations .
Our results concerning s tabiliza tion of endogenous business cycles will re ly on
some re la tionships be tween the perfect fores ight dynamic W and the exis tence of
cycles and sunspot equilibria . It is well-known that if W is such tha t an -cycle exis ts
then there is a lso a truly s tochas tic -s ta te SSE close to the cycle , see Guesnerie
and Woodford (1992). It is not genera lly true tha t the exis tence of a SSE implies
the exis tence of determinis tic cycles , or, equiva lently, tha t non-exis tence of cycles
implies non-exis tence of SSE. For our purposes it is , however, important to es tablish
such a connection. In Appendix B we prove a propos ition s ta ting some genera l
conditions under which the exis tence of a SSE implies the exis tence of a 2-period
cycle . The conditions are such that we will be able to conclude that the policy
rules which eliminate a ll cycles through es tablishing global s tability according to W
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of the moneta ry s teady s ta te , a lso eliminate a ll SSE.5 By virtue of these and some
other well-known results it will suÁ ce in what follows to s tudy the perfect fores ight
dynamic W . To be precise we will make use of the following standard d´ynamic
properties :´
Indeterminacy. If W is loca lly well-de¿ ned around s teady s ta te and the s lope of W
a t the s teady s ta te is be low minus one or above one, then the s teady sta te is locally
s table in the forward direction under perfect fores ight, and the s teady sta te is sa id to
be inde te rminate . It is well known that indeterminacy implies the exis tence of SSE
arbitrarily close to the s teady s ta te , see Guesnerie and Woodford (1992), and for
the dynamics we cons ider, if W Iwrw#DD c d, the re are a lso de te rminis tic cycles . It is
an o´pening assumption´of this paper tha t inde te rminacy is a suÁ cient condition
for a cycle or a sunspot equilibrium to be the re levant dynamic equilibrium (if it
were the steady s ta te there would not be a s tabiliza tion problem). In favor of this
assumption is the fact tha t for plaus ible backward looking lea rning rules , a s teady
s ta te (or cycle) is loca lly unstable according to learning dynamics exactly when it
is s table according to forward perfect fores ight dynamics , see Grandmont (1985),
Marcet and Sargent (1989), Evans and Honkapojha (1995).6
De te rminacy. Assume that by appropria te use of one of the policy rules cons id-
e red it can be obta ined that the s teady s ta te rw#D becomes globa lly s table according
to W , implying that W is globa lly well-de¿ ned. Then there can be no de te rminis tic
cycles and, from Theorem B shown in Appendix B, for the policy rules that we ¿ nd
indeed can make rw#D globally s table according to W , no SSE eithe r. The s teady
s ta te is then the only reasonable bounded and continuously well-de¿ ned ra tiona l
expecta tions equilibrium, and one says tha t the steady s ta te is (globally) deter-
mina te . De te rminacy will be cons ide red a suÁ cient condition for s tabiliza tion at
s teady s ta te .
5 The method used in Appendix B to es tablish tha t exis tence of a SSE implies exis tence of a
2-pe riod cycle is s imila r to the one used by Grandmont (1986). However, the dynamics aris ing
from our policy rules are not covered by the genera lity of Grandmont's result. Therefore the
theorem in Appendix B genera lizes Grandmont's result and it may therefore be of independent
inte res t.
6 The robustness of this r´eve rs ion of s tability properties r´esult has more recently been disputed
by Grandmont (1998).
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4 Stabiliza tion
Inserting the cons idered speci¿ c functiona l form of policy rules into (5) gives ,
r08
Iwd r0D ) wr0Ld  #r
d
0Ld r

0 D‘
Iwr0LdD, (8)
which de¿ nes r0 ) Wwr0LdD at leas t loca lly around s teady s ta te rw#D. For any ? k (,
a t which Ww?D is well-de¿ ned, the s lope of W is obta ined by implicit di¾ erentia tion
of (8) written as Ww?D8Iwd Ww?DD ) >? #?dWw?DH‘Iw?D. This gives ,
W Iw?D )
Ww?D
?
d #wd DwWw?D
?
D 
p
d #wWw?D
?
D
Q
pw?D
d #wd DwWw?D
?
D L
p
d #wWw?D
?
D
Q
]wWw?DD
3 (9)
Measuring W I a t s teady s ta te where ? ) Ww?D ) rw#D gives ,
W Iwrw#DD )
d #wd D wd #Dpwrw#DD
d #wd D L wd #D]wrw#DD
3 (10)
Assume # k (. If a lso  k (, then W is globally well-de¿ ned, and for any
r0Ld k (, the r0 tha t solves (8) is be low r0Ldb#db. Hence , as r0Ld goes to ze ro, so
must this r0, implying Ww(D U) j$8?( Ww?D ) (. If  ) (, then W is s till globally
well-de¿ ned, and (8) reads r08Iwd r0D ) wd #Dr0Ld‘Iwr0LdD. As r0Ld goes to zero,
so will the right hand s ide if and only if pw(D c d.7 Hence , if pw(D c d, one s till
has Ww(D ) (, whereas if pw(D k d, one has Ww(D ) d.
Taken toge ther, if , # k ( or if  ) ( and pw(D c d, the globally well-de¿ ned
backward dynamic W s ta rts a t zero, Ww(D ) (, and s tays everywhere below one,
Ww?D c d. If W ends at ze ro, Ww D ) (, it mus t have a number of critica l points
w?, Ww?DD a t which W Iw?D ) (. If it ends elsewhere it may or may not have critica l
points . In any case , W has a shape such tha t if a ll critica l points are be low the
45H-line , i.e . ful¿ ll Ww?Db? c d, then rw#D is globally s table according to W . This
excludes determinis tic cycles , and s ince the genera l conditions of Propos ition B in
Appendix B are sa tis¿ ed when   (, the re is no SSE either, and the s teady s ta te
is determinate . This a rgument is used to es tablish Propos ition 1.8
7 Note tha t pw(D is the e la s ticity measure of how fas t `Iwr0LdD goes to in¿ nity as r0Ld goes to
zero. Hence , if pw(D c d, the product r0Ld`Iwr0LdD goes to zero as r0Ld goes to zero e tc.
8 Since Proposition 1 is on s tabiliza tion, one could natura lly expect an underlying assumption
of inde te rminacy of s teady s ta te unde r la is sez fa ire , W Iwrw(DD c d (k d is not poss ible ). However,
W Iwrw(DD c d is not s trictly necessary for the exis tence of ra tiona l expecta tions endogenous
À uctua tions , and Propos ition 1 does not assume it.
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Propos ition 1. (S tabiliza tion: suÁ cient conditions for policy rules to es tablish
determinacy).
(i) For any  k (, the re is a #	wD c d, such that if the policy rule involves 
and # with # k #	wD, then the steady s ta te rw#D is de te rmina te and there are no
cycles or s ta tionary sunspot equilibria .
(ii) If  ) ( and pw(D c d, the re a lso exis ts a #	 c d, such that # k #	 implies
determinacy of the s teady s ta te and non-exis tence of cycles and s ta tionary sunspot
equilibria ..
(ii) For any # k (, there is an 	w#D k (, such tha t if the policy rule involves 
and # with  k 	w#D, then the s teady s ta te rw#D is determinate and there a re no
cycles or s ta tionary sunspot equilibria .
Propos ition 1 is our main result. For any s trictly pos itive choice of the cyclica l
component  of the policy rule , a suÁ ciently la rge level component # will s tabilize
the economy at s teady s ta te , and for some assumptions on fundamenta ls the same
is true for  ) (. It a lso says that for any s trictly pos itive choice of the leve l
component #, in particula r for (arbitrarily) small va lues , a large enough cyclica l
component  will s tabilize the economy at s teady s ta te .
These are suÁ cient conditions for s tabiliza tion. It is of particular interes t to
know if a low va lue of # necess ita tes a high value of  for s tabiliza tion. It may
not, of course , if the economy does not have any bus iness cycle problem at a ll. The
issue should therefore be addressed under an explicit assumption of the presence of
a s tabiliza tion problem. There fore Propos ition 2 assumes W Iwrw(DD c d. In this
case la rge values of  are indeed necessa ry for s tabiliza tion, given small values of #.
P ropos ition 2. (Stabiliza tion: a necessa ry condition for policy rules to es-
tablish de te rminacy). Assume W Iwrw(DD c d. For a ll small enough # k (, it is
necessary and suÁ cient for a policy rule to imply d  W Iwrw#DD  d, and the refore
necessary for de te rminacy of the s teady s ta te rw#D, tha t  is grea te r than or equal
to a ce rta in 		w# D, where 		w# D goes to in¿ nity as # goes to ze ro.
The two propos itions above do not exclude that la rge enough values of # could
a lso stabilize the economy for negative va lues of , or genera lly for  ) (. Ne ither
do they exclude that for some values of #, nega tive and small enough va lues of 
could s tabilize the economy. Propos ition 3, however, rules out these poss ibilities .
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Propos ition 3. (Des tabiliza tion: suÁ cient conditions for policy rules to imply
indeterminacy).
(i) If  c (, then W Iwrw#DD k d for a ll suÁ ciently la rge #; hence , the s teady
s ta te rw#D is inde te rmina te and s ta tionary sunspot equilibria exis t.
(ii) If  ) ( and pw(D k 1 L]w(D, then W Iwrw#DD c d for a ll suÁ ciently large
#; hence , the s teady s ta te rw#D is indeterminate and both de terminis tic cycles and
s ta tionary sunspot equilibria exis t.
(iii) If # k (, then W Iwrw#DD k d for a ll nega tive and suÁ ciently small ; hence ,
the s teady s ta te rw#D is indeterminate and s ta tionary sunspot equilibria exis t.
We proceed by ra is ing a number of important remarks :
Elas ticity and inde terminacy. It is well-known tha t for the suÁ cient condition
for indeterminacy under la issez fa ire , W Iwrw(DD c d, to be ful¿ lled it is required
tha t the e las ticity of labor supply with respect to the real wage at s teady s ta te is
le ss than minus one half. Inserting into the  of footnote 2, tha t a t s teady s ta te
zL K ) r, z ) wd #Dr, and K ) #r, one ge ts for the elas ticity a t s teady sta te ,
w#D )
d wd #Dpwrw#DD
]wrw#DD L wd #Dpwrw#DD
3
From (10), W Iwrw(DD c d hp pw(D k 1 L ]w(D, and it is easy to see that this
implies w(D c db1. Although not necessary, W Iwrw(DD c d is kind of a s´ ine qua
non c´ondition for endogenous À uctua tions under la issez fa ire , and it has often been
held aga ins t the theory of such À uctuations tha t W Iwrw(DD c d can only be ful¿ lled
for unrea lis tic va lues of the e las ticity of labor supply. Proposition 3 says that if
 c (, or if  ) ( and pw(D k 1 L ]w(D, a suÁ cient condition for inde terminacy,
Wwrw#DD c d or Wwrw#DD k d, is ful¿ lled for a ll suÁ ciently la rge #. As # goes to one,
w#D goes to db]w(D k (, so for a ll la rge enough #, one has both indete rminacy,
and w#D k (. All tha t it is needed to overcome the unrealis tic requirement on the
e las ticity of labor supply is an inappropria te government policy, and this does not
have to be more peculia r than a cons tant money growth ra te rule .9
Welfare . The above propositions are about output s tabiliza tion which should
only be an a im for economic policy if output s tabiliza tion has good welfa re impli-
ca tions . For the lite ra l overlapping genera tions interpre ta tion of our mode l, output
9 This way of overcoming the requirement of a (very) negative ly s loped labor demand curve is
close ly re la ted to the i´mperfect competition and pos itive pro¿ ts´way found in Jacobsen (2000).
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s tabiliza tion can never be genera lly Pare to improving. Along a two-period cycle the
genera tions who are young when output is low are fortuna te , s ince they work little
while young and consume much when old. Stabiliza tion can only give these gen-
e ra tions lower utility. However, for tha t mode l interpre ta tion it seems reasonable
to le t a lso a concern of equity across genera tions enter into welfa re cons idera tions .
For the mode l interpre ta tion with an in¿ nite ly-lived consumer and cash-in-advance
cons tra ints , output s tabiliza tion is good because of the concavity of utility func-
tions , but a t the same time it is bad because of the dis tortion of the s teady s ta te it
implies . For both model interpre ta tions an economic policy tha t s tabilizes output a t
s teady s ta te can be cons idered to have good welfare implica tions if the s teady s ta te
is not too dis torted by the policy. Therefore the above propos itions , in combina tion
with Propos ition A, have s trong welfare implica tions . For any given  k (, the
economy can be s tabilized at the s teady s ta te rw#D, if # is la rge enough. This may
require a high value of #, and there fore imply a la rge dis tortion of the s teady s ta te .
However, for any s trictly pos itive value of #, no matter how small, the economy
will be s tabilized a t the s teady s ta te rw#D, if  is se t suÁ ciently high. Tha t is , one
can s tabilize the economy at s teady s ta te for an arbitrarily small dis tortion #, by
choos ing a large enough . Our propositions point to output s tabiliza tion by policy
rules with low values of # and correspondingly high va lues of : more e lements of
countercyclica lity help to give stabiliza tion with lower levels of dis tortion.
Countercyca lity. It is in the sense described earlie r tha t the rules pointed to
a re countercyclica l. They will require  k db1 and, eas ily, values of  above one,
for low enough va lues of # (Propos ition 2). So, the policy rules which are bes t in
terms of welfare a re such that government activity is re la tive ly low in periods up to
which output has increased by a re la tive ly large amount. This is not exactly coun-
tercyclica lity in the usua l sense of re la tive ly low government activity when output is
re la tive ly high, but such rules will, neverthe less , often appear countercyclica l in the
usual sense (e .g. over two-period cycles), and they certa inly do have a Keynesian
À avor - but not for Keynes ian reasons.
Intuition. No nominal or rea l rigidities have been assumed. So, why is it tha t
the policy rules we have called counte rcyclica l are the most s tabilizing? If a policy
can e liminate changes in GNP, it will have s tabilized the economy. Assume that
the economy evolves according to some cycle , and tha t output increases from the
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current to the next period. The more countercyclica l the policy rule is , the lower a
real transfe r it will pay the next period, because the higher  is , the more negative
dependence on GNP increases the rule conta ins . Because goods are normal, a lower
value of the rea l transfer in the next period is exactly wha t it takes to make the
consumer work more in the current one , thus increas ing output here and diminishing
the change in GNP from the current to the next period.
Re la ted lite ra ture . Grandmont (1986) has assumptions with the same e¾ ect as
pw(D c d here and cons ide rs cons tant money growth ra te rules . One of his results
is s imila r to Propos ition 1(ii). In view of Propos ition 2, policy rules with  ) (
are just a t the boundary of the se t of rules tha t can be stabilizing for la rge enough
values of #, and even when they are in this se t, they may well be the ones giving
output s tabiliza tion in the wors t poss ible way welfa rewise , requiring the larges t #.
S implicity and Credibility. Policy rules with values of  way above one and with
very low values of # s tabilize in the bes t way. As already argued such rules are not
very s imple . Furthermore , they may involve a credibility problem. At the s teady
s ta te rw#D, a t which the economy is s tabilized, one will not see much government
activity, only the cons tant and low #rw#D. The government may have problems
convincing the public that this is only because À uctua tions do not presently occur,
and tha t should À uctua tions occur the government would react s trongly in accor-
dance with its high . S implicity and credibility considera tions point to rules with
non-extreme va lues of , say (    d. We will there fore , for a speci¿ ca tion of ‘
and 8, cons ider the two particula r cases  ) ( and  ) d. The two resulting rules
a re s itua ted symmetrica lly around the a´cyclica llity point´ ) db1, with one end
( ) () being the often sugges ted constant money growth ra te rule , and both are
of equal s tructura l s implicity. The examples will nice ly illus tra te the importance of
the cyclica llity of policy rules .
5 Transfe rs Proportional to Current or Past GNP
Consider the speci¿ ca tions ,
‘wD ) &
wL (D
dp
d p
, 8wD )
dp
d p
where (  (, & k (, p k (, (11)
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for which pwD ) pbw L (D, and ]wzD ) pzbwd  zD. Thus , if ( k (, one has
pw(D ) ( c d, and when ( ) (, one has pwD ) p, and in particular pw(D k
1 L]w(D, whenever p k 1.10
For this example we cons ide r the policy rules t´ransfers proportional to current
GNP,´ Kwr0Ld, r0D ) #r0Ld,11 and t´rans fe rs proportional to pas t GNP,´ Kwr0Ld, r0D )
#r0, corresponding to  ) ( and  ) d respective ly.
Firs t we le t p ) ;, ( ) (3(E, and & ) (3((E. This is a case where , even for
 ) (, a large enough # will be s tabilizing. It is , in addition, a case that gives a
traditiona l h´ump-shaped,´ or uni-moda l, dynamic W with one critica l point. For
each case of  ) ( and  ) d, we ite ra te according to the re levant W s ta rting a t the
critica l point. One is then led to the (determinis tic) dynamic equilibrium which is
s table according to W (a t mos t one is), and hence plaus ibly learning s table . This
is a two-period cycle under la issez fa ire , # ) (, and for both  ) ( and  ) d, it
remains as such for # up to the level tha t s tabilizes the economy.
In Figure 1, where (i) is for  ) (, and (ii) is for  ) d, the solidly drawn
curves show the common utility of a ll genera tions a t s teady s ta te as a function
of #; this curve is the same for  ) ( and  ) d. In the model interpre ta tion
with an in¿ nite ly lived agent the curve shows the s teady s ta te utility of this agent.
The 	-dotted curves show, for  ) ( in Figure 1(i) and for  ) d in Figure 1(ii),
the utilities of the fortunate and the unfortuna te genera tions respective ly, a t the
s table two-period cycle as a function of #. The fortunate genera tions are those who
are young when output is low and therefore work little , and old when output is
high and therefore consume much. In the alternative inte rpre ta tion the utility of
the representa tive consumer a long the two-period cycles would be more or less the
10 This example does not ful¿ ll a ll above requirements s ince `I does not go to in¿ nity as 
goes to zero when ( k (. However, when we consider the example we simply ¿ nd equilibria
by computa tion and we do not need nice b´oundary behavior.´ The lack of an in¿ nite margina l
utility a t zero is no problem for the computa tions as long as # is be low an appropria te upper limit,
which is sa tis¿ ed in a ll numerica l s imula tions be low.
11 It was sa id earlie r in the paper tha t this is equiva lent to a cons tant money growth ra te rule . To
see this note tha t without income taxa tion the money s tock must evolve as -0Ld-0 ) 0LdK0Ld.
The growth ra te Q0Ld of the money s tock from end of period 0 to end of period 0Ld is thus Q0Ld )
0LdK0Ldb-0 hp -0 ) 0LdK0LdbQ0Ld. The second period budget cons tra int for the consumer
reads -0 ) 0Ldw0LdK0LdD, where it is used tha t in equilibrium the amount of money held by the
consumer a t the end of 0 must be the economy's entire money s tock at the end of 0. By equalizing
the two express ions for -0 we get K0LdbQ0Ld ) 0Ld K0Ld, or K0Ld ) wQ0LdbwdL Q0LdDDr0Ld, where
it was used tha t in equilibrium 0Ld ) r0Ld. Hence a rule of no income taxa tion and constant
money growth ra te Q is equiva lent to our rule with # ) Qbwd L QD.
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average of the two 	-dotted curves .
It follows from Figure 1 that for this example , which has been deviced such tha t
the policy rule with  ) ( is indeed capable of s tabilizing the economy, the sta -
biliza tion obta ined by increas ing # from zero has much be tter welfa re implica tions
for  ) d, than for  ) (.
c Figure 1 here k
Figure 2 reports on the example (11), with p ) ; and ( ) (. Now pw(D k
1 L ]w(D, implying that for  ) (, increas ing # will not be s tabilizing. Hence,
for  ) (, we assume & ) (3d, which implies tha t W Iwrw(DD k d, and the s teady
s ta te is s table according to W under la is sez fa ire . For  ) d, we cons ider & ) (3(x,
which implies W Iwrw(DD c d, and under la issez fa ire it is a two-period cycle that is
s table according to W . Otherwise Figure 2 is like Figure 1, and shows, for various
values of #, the dynamic equilibrium tha t is s table according to W , for  ) ( in (i),
and for  ) d in (ii). For  ) (, increas ing # ¿ rs t changes the s table equilibrium
from the s teady s ta te to a cycle , and from then on it implies increas ing vola tility of
utility. For  ) d, one obta ins s tabiliza tion by increas ing #, and the implica tions
for welfare a re good.
These examples illus tra te how cons tant money growth ra te rules , or rules where
government activity is linked to current GNP ( ) (), a re outperformed with re -
spect to s tabiliza tion, and the re la ted welfare implica tions , by a class of rules which
are s tructura lly as s imple ; namely rules where government activity is linked to GNP
with a certa in de lay ( ) d). The la tter conta ins an element of countercyclica lity
which is important for s tabilizing endogenous competitive À uctuations .
c Figure 2 here k
6 Conclus ions
We have s tudied a s imple monetary competitive mode l with intertempora lly opti-
mizing agents . The mode l can be interpre ted e ither as an overlapping genera tions
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model or as a model with in¿ nite ly lived agents and cash-in-advance cons tra ints .
In any case there is a unique mone tary s teady s ta te according to the mode l.
If this s teady s ta te could a lways be assumed to be the re levant ra tional expecta-
tions dynamic equilibrium, government activity would be , in the cons idered model,
unambiguous ly bad on welfa re grounds . However, under some circumstances the re
a lso exis t under la issez fa ire othe r bounded and continuous ly well-de¿ ned ra tional
expecta tions equilibrium tra jectories , i.e . de te rminis tic cycles or sunspot equilibria .
If a cycle or sunspot equilibrium is the re levant ra tional expecta tions dynamic
equilibrium under la issez fa ire we are led, within the cons ide red model, to two
(interdependent) main conclus ions with respect to government s tabiliza tion policy.
The ¿ rs t conclus ion is tha t government intervention may be well motiva ted
s ince it may s tabilize economic activity in a way that has positive consequences
for welfa re . It is the departure from the s teady s ta te to some kind of endogenous
À uctuation as the re levant equilibrium that leads to this conclus ion. Even in the
presence of exogenous shocks, if it could be safe ly assumed that the economy was
a lways a t - or close to and approaching - a competitive s teady s ta te (as in RBC
models ), then it would be hard to justify government intervention for s tabiliza tion
reasons .
The second conclus ion derived from the mode l is tha t the bes t s tabiliza tion
principles - i.e . the policy rules tha t s tabilize economic activity in a way that is
best for welfare - enta il a certa in kind of countercyclica lity in government activity;
government should provide re la tive ly small transfers and/or small amounts of public
goods in periods up to which GNP has increased by a re la tive ly la rge amount.
We take a modes t view concerning the s igni¿ cance for actual s tabiliza tion poli-
cies of these mode l results . Insofar as À uctua tions or cyclica l movements in economic
activity can be viewed as (a t leas t pa rtly) crea ted endogenously by vola tile and self-
ful¿ lling expecta tions , some inte rtempora l e¾ ects of s tabiliza tion policies , which do
not usua lly gain so much a ttention, become important. It is a logica l poss ibility
tha t these intertemporal e¾ ects work in such a way that good s tabiliza tion princi-
ples involve a kind of countercyclica lity in government activity tha t is reminiscent
of what is advoca ted by Keynes ians .
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A Proofs
Proof of Propos ition 1. Firs t note that for a ll the s ta ted conditions in Theorem
1 under which the s teady s ta te is de termina te we have   (. It then follows from
Proposition B of Appendix B, that global s tability of rw#D according to W (globa l
determinacy), which obviously must e limina te a ll cycles , a lso e liminates a ll SSE.
We are going to show tha t for the #	wD of (i), one can use 8s-?;>(,dH pw?Ddpw?DdL c
d if this is non-nega tive and zero otherwise . For the 	w#D of (iii), one can use
d#
#
8s-?;>(,dHwpw?D dDD if this is s trictly pos itive and an arbitrarily small s trictly
positive value otherwise .
From (9), a critica l point is given by d#wdDwWw?D
?
D
p
d #wWw?D
?
D
Q
pw?D ) (.
This implies tha t a t a critica l point one must have pw?D k d, whenever  k (, and,
w
Ww?D
?
D )
d
#
pw?D d
pw?D d L 
3
A critica l point w?, Ww?DD is below the 45H-degree line if Ww?Db? c d, which has
to be ful¿ lled if ?  d, s ince Ww?D c d for a ll ?. The denominator above is s trictly
positive at a critica l point when  k (, so for  k (, Ww?Db? c d is equivalent to,
# k
pw?D d
pw?D d L 
, (12)
and to,
 k
d #
#
wpw?D dD3 (13)
Now, if # k #	wD, then in particular (12) is ful¿ lled for any critica l point ? c d,
implying tha t Ww?Db? c d. This proves (i). If  k 	w#D, then in particular (13)
is ful¿ lled for any critica l point ? c d, implying that Ww?Db? c d. This proves
(iii).
For (ii) note that the perfect fores ight dynamic (8) for  ) ( becomes r08Iwd
r0D ) wd #Dr0Ld‘
Iwr0LdD, so for # going to one the r0 tha t solves it mus t go to zero
for any value of r0Ld. This means tha t Ww?D is pulled down arbitrarily close to the
?-axis . Further, from (9) a critica l point is given by pw?D ) d independently of #.
So, as # is increased a ll critica l points w?, Ww?DD move downwards along the same
value of ? with Ww?D getting arbitrarily close to the ?-axis , so eventually they a ll
go below the 45H-line .
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Proof of Propos ition 2. From (10) one sees that if the denomina tor of W Iwrw#DD
is nega tive (which it can be for  c (), then W Iwrw#DD k d. So, to exclude W Iwrw#DD k
d, one must se t  such that the denominator is pos itive , for which   ( suÁ ces . On
the other hand, for such an , the necessary condition for avoiding indeterminacy,
W Iwrw#DD  d, is equiva lent to,
  		w#D U)
d
1
d #
#
wpwrw#DD]wrw#DD 1D3
From (10), W Iwrw(DD c d implies pw(D  ]w(D  1 k (, which means that for a
small enough #, the parenthesis on the right hand s ide is pos itive , so an  ful¿ lling
the inequa lity a lso ful¿ ls   (. Finally, as # goes to ze ro, the required 		w#D goes
to in¿ nity because the parenthes is goes to pw(D]w(D 1 k (, and wd#Db# goes
to in¿ nity.
Proof of Propos ition 3. (i) When  c (, one sees from (10), tha t as # goes to
one, W Iwrw#DD goes to b ) d, so both numerator and denomina tor become negative
for a large enough #, but the numera tor is numerica lly the la rgest, so W Iwrw#DD goes
to one from above. Hence, for a ll suÁ ciently large #, one has W Iwrw#DD k d, meaning
tha t the s teady s ta te is inde te rminate and an SSE exis ts .
(ii) Again from (10), if  ) (, the s lope of W a t s teady s ta te is W Iwrw#DD )
dpwrw#DD
dL]wrw#DD
. As # goes to one , rw#D goes to ze ro (Propos ition A), and hence W Iwrw#DD
goes to dpw(D
dL]w(D
, which is less than -1 exactly because pw(D k 1L]w(D. If j$8#d W Iwrw#DD c
d, then from continuity a lso W Iwrw#DD c d for a ll la rge enough #. Hence rw#D
is indetermina te , which suÁ ces for the exis tence of SSE close to it. When W is
globa lly well-de¿ ned and known to s tay be low a c´e iling,´ Ww?D c d for a ll ?, then
W Iwrw#DD c d also suÁ ces for the exis tence of determinis tic cycles .
(iii) For # k (, when  becomes negative and suÁ ciently la rge numerica lly, both
the numera tor and the denominator in (10) become negative with the numerator
numerica lly the larges t, so W Iwrw#DD k d.
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B Conditions for the Exis tence of SSE to Imply
the Exis tence of Determinis tic Cycles
Inserting the speci¿ c form (1) of policy rules into the equations (7) tha t a SSE must
ful¿ ll gives the equa tions ,
r78
Iwd r7D )
3
i)d
R7i

ri  #r
d
i r

7 D
=
‘IwriD for 7 ) d, 333, 3
The left hand s ide can be ca lled 8dwr7D, and if one on the right hand side uses
81wr7, riD U)

ri  #r
d
i r

7 D
=
‘IwriD, the equa tions become,
8dwr7D )
3
i)d
R7i81wr7, riD for 7 ) d, 333, 3 (14)
The backward perfect fores ight dynamic Ww?D is then given implicitly (as the solution
in F) by 8dwFD ) 81wF, ?D. Under the assumptions made in this paper, 8dwr7D is s trictly
increas ing, and when   (, 81wr7, riD is e ithe r independent of r7 (for  ) (), or
s trictly decreas ing in r7 (for  k (). Furthe rmore , s till for   (, the perfect
fores ight dynamic W is globally well-de¿ ned and continuous (and di¾ erentiable),
s tays be low one , and with exactly one monetary s teady s ta te . This motiva tes ,
Assumption 1. 8dwr7D is s trictly increas ing in r7, and 81wr7, riD is (weakly)
decreasing in r7.
Assumption 2. For every ? k (, there is a unique solution in F to 8dwFD )
81wF, ?D, and the backward perfect fores ight dynamic Ww?D ) F thus de¿ ned is
continuous, Ww?D c d for a ll ?, and the re is exactly one r k (, tha t solves WwrD ) r.
So, for a ll policy rules with   (, these two assumptions are ful¿ lled for the
mode l cons idered in the main text of this paper. They are a lso the assumptions
underlying Proposition B be low. This is why we have been able to conclude that
for policy rules with   (, if there are no de te rminis tic cycles (as there cannot be
if the s teady s ta te r k ( is globally s table according to W ), then the re are no SSE
either.
Theorem B. Le t 8d and 81 be such tha t Assumptions 1 and 2 are ful¿ lled.
If there a re rd  N N N  r, with rd c r, and an irreducible matrix wR7iD of
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trans ition probabilities , such tha t (14) is ful¿ lled, then there are a lso rI, rII with
( c rI c rII c d, such tha t rI ) WwrIID and rII ) WwrID. That is , if there is a
s ta tionary Markov sunspot equilibrium SSE, then there is a lso a two-period cycle ,
or, if there is no two-period cycle , then the re is no SSE either.
Proof.12 One can sa fe ly assume tha t a ll transition probabilities ful¿ ll R7i k (.13
For each 7 ) d, 333,  de¿ ne,
r8$t7 U) s 8$t
i;\d,333,i
81wr7, riD,
r8s-7 U) s 8s-
i;\d,333,i
81wr7, riD3
Since from (14), each 8dwr7D is an average of the  values of 81wr7, riD, i ) d, 333, ,
one must have 81wr7, r8$t7 D  8dwr7D  81wr7, r8s-7 D for 7 ) d, 333, . In particula r for
7 ) d and ,
81wrd, r
8$t
d
D  8dwrdD  81wrd, r
8s-
d
D,
81wr, r
8$t
 D  8dwrD  81wr, r
8s-
 D3
Since 81 is decreas ing in its ¿ rs t argument we have : 81wr, r8s- D  81wrd, r8s- D 
81wrd, r
8s-
d
D, and 81wrd, r8$td D  81wr, r8$td D  81wr, r8$t D. So, now using tha t 8dwr7D
is s trictly increas ing in r7, we ge t,
81wr, r
8$t
 D  81wrd, r
8$t
d
D  8dwrdD c 8dwrD  81wr, r
8s-
 D  81wrd, r
8s-
d
D3
Part of this is 81wrd, r8$td D c 81wrd, r8s-d D, and s ince a ll trans ition probabilitie s Rdi
are s trictly pos itive , one gets 8dwrdD k 81wrd, r8$td D. S imilarly, 8dwrD c 81wr, r8s- D.
We have thus es tablished,
81wrd, r
8$t
d
D c 8dwrdD  8dwr1D  N N N  8dwrD c 81wr, r
8s-
 D3 (15)
For one 7, one has r7 ) r8$td , and hence 8dwr8$td D k 81wrd, r8$td D  81wr8$td , r8$td D,
where the la tter follows s ince 81 is decreas ing in its ¿ rs t a rgument. Hence , 8dwr8$td D k
12 This proof extends the result of Grandmont (1986) from the case where 81 is independent of
r7, to the case where 81 is weakly decreas ing in r7.
13 We appea l here to s tandard results . For dynamic sys tems as considered here , if there is a
de terminis tic cycle , tha t is , a comple te ly non-s tochas tic SSE where for each 7, only one R7i is
grea te r than zero (equa l to one), then there is a lso a fully s tochas tic SSE where a ll R7i a re s trictly
positive . By the same reasoning, if the re is an SSE where for each 7, some, but not a ll, R7i are
s trictly pos itive , then there is a lso a fully s tochas tic SSE, cf. Guesnerie and Woodford (1992).
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81wr
8$t
d
, r8$t
d
D, but this implies that Wwr8$t
d
D c r8$t
d
. (Remember tha t Wwr8$t
d
D is the
solution in F to 8dwFD ) 81wF, r8$td D. For F ) r8$td , one gets s´ trictly la rge r than.´
The solution is then to be found s trictly below r8$t
d
, s ince 8d is s trictly increas ing,
and 81 is decreas ing, in F). Simila rly, for one 7, one must have r7 ) r8s- , so
8dwr
8s-
 D c 81wr, r
8s-
 D  81wr
8s-
 , r
8s-
 D, implying Wwr8s- D k r8s- . So, we have
both Wwr8$t
d
D c r8$t
d
and Wwr8s- D k r8s- 3 This implies , of course , tha t r8$td W) r8s- ,
but a lso tha t,
r8s- c r
8$t
d
3
Otherwise one would have Wwr8$t
d
D c r8$t
d
c r8s- c Wwr
8s-
 D, which from the con-
tinuity and W c d parts of Assumption 2 would imply the exis tence of a monetary
s teady s ta te s trictly be tween r8$t
d
and r8s- , and one s trictly above r8s- , contra -
dicting the uniqueness of monetary s teady s ta te part of Assumption 2.
Also from (15), one has directly tha t 8dwrdD k 81wrd, r8$td D, which implies Wwr8$td D c
rd (by the same reasoning as above), and s imilarly 8dwrD c 81wr, r8s- D, implying
Wwr8s- D k r. S ince also rd  r8s- , and r8$td  r, one has ,
Wwr8$t
d
D c r8s- and r8$td c Wwr8s- D3
Combining the two las t displayed inequalities gives ,
Wwr8$t
d
D c r8s- c r
8$t
d
c Wwr8s- D3
Given that W is continuous and s tays be low the c´e iling´one, this suÁ ces for the
exis tence of a two period cycle : Note tha t the obta ined inequality s ta tes that W
has a negative s lope below minus one over an inte rval a round the s teady s ta te , not
necessarily in¿ nites imally close to it. However, the kind of non-local nega tive s lope
be low minus one obta ined suÁ ces from a s tandard argument. If one cons tructs the
mirror image of W around the 45H-line then this has , under the obta ined condition
and Assumption 2, to intersect W itse lf a t two points rI and rII di¾ erent from the
s teady s ta te . These rI and rII de¿ ne a two-period cycle .
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FIGURE 1, p ) ;, ( ) 3(E, & ) 3((E
FIGURE 2, p ) ;, ( ) (, and in (i) & ) 3d, and in (ii) & ) 3(x
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